

National Intelligence Daily

Thursday 23 June 1983





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International: Outlook for Oil Prices 8

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| | WARSAW PACT-NATO: New Proposal on MBFR | |
| | The East plans to offer a new draft MBFR treaty today calling for force reductions over a three-year period to 900,000 men on each side. | |
| | | |
| | The proposal includes a number of verification measures to monitor residual force levels, including on-site inspection—but with right of refusal. Three to four checkpoints would be established where observers would monitor movement of forces into and out of the area after reductions. The proposal makes no provision for agreement on existing manpower levels or on the reductions necessary to reach parity—the "data" issue on which the West insists there has to be agreement. | |
| | Comment: The treaty formalizes the third element of the Eastern "package" offered in February, which also proposed initial US-Soviet reductions "by example," and a subsequent freeze on East-West forces. The East evidently hopes that its forthcoming position on verification will persuade the West to ease its demands that any accord has to be based on prior agreement on manpower data. It also will publicize the proposal to strengthen its image as an advocate of arms control during the period before INF deployments. | |
| | The East's proposal will prompt further consideration in some Western capitals of forgoing a prior agreement on force-level data in exchange for adequate verification measures. West European delegations are anxious for progress toward an MBFR agreement, | |
| | partly to help win public support for INF deployments. | |
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USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Summit Planned

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| | a summit of Soviet and East | 25X1 |
| European leaders will be held in Mosco | w from 28 to 30 June. | 25X1 |
| Polish and Yugoslav diplomats in E | ast Berlin say the meeting w | vill |
| be the long-postponed CEMA Summit. | The CEMA Executive | |
| Committee reportedly is to meet in Mos preparations. Some Yugoslav press sou | | 16 |
| meeting next week is to be a gathering | of Soviet and East Europea | in É |
| party leaders to deal with security issue | es. | 25X1 |
| Comment: If the CEMA Summit do | es take place next week, | |
| urgent considerations presumably have | | |
| longstanding insistence that it be sched members agree on an agenda. There is | | |
| suggest that the members are any clos | er to agreement on a numbe | |
| of contentious economic issues than the time, a CEMA working group advised to | | |
| before this fall. | | 25X1 |
| The fact that the Summit is to be h | eld just before West Germa | n |
| Chancellor Kohl's arrival in Moscow on | | |
| intended instead to address security is allies may issue a statement on arms qu | | ne |
| made last month at Williamsburg. Such | a statement almost certain | |
| would affirm a consensus by members need to take countermeasures in response | | |
| deployments. | | 25X1 |



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MEXICO: Reduced Military Purchases

Comment: Despite economic realities, both the armed forces and foreign firms presumably are taking advantage of the government's growing concern about regional and domestic security to push their favorite projects. Nevertheless, Mexico probably will not make any sizable new military purchases until the economy picks up, which will take at least several years. The only deals likely to go through in the near future are those for spare parts, armament, and internal security-related items.

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USSR: New Party Boss for Leningrad

Lev Zaykov, the 60-year-old "mayor" of Leningrad and veteran manager of defense industrial enterprises, was named on Tuesday to replace Leningrad party boss Romanov. Last week Romanov was promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat. Politburo member Gorbachev—a supporter of President Andropov—and Romanov presided over the party meeting that approved Zaykov's appointment.

Comment: Zaykov—who has no known ties to Andropov—may not have been Romanov's choice, because Romanov ignored previous opportunities to promote him. His selection follows the recent appointment of three other officials associated with Defense Minister Ustinov to full membership on the Central Committee. Zaykov's new position puts him in line for eventual Politburo membership. The fact that Gorbachev joined Romanov in presiding over Zaykov's installation could be interpreted by some members of the elite as an undercutting of Romanov's prestige.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Antigovernment Protest

The apparently spontaneous protest by about 300 Czechoslovak youths in Prague is an acute embarrassment for the authorities, who went to considerable effort to make a favorable impression on the more than 2,000 foreign participants at the current World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War. The youths, chanting calls for freedom, disrupted an official rally opening the five-day conference and later marched on the city's main square. The riot police, who made several arrests while breaking up the demonstration, were jeered by onlookers. The protest was the largest antigovernment disturbance since the demonstrations in 1969 that marked the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion.

Comment: The insecure and deeply divided leadership may be further polarized by this show of public disaffection at a time of serious economic decline. Hardliners may seize on the incident to argue for a tightening of political controls and a slowing of the regime's already cautious movement toward economic reform.


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| | LEBANON: Actions Against Palestinians | | |
| | The anti-Palestinian campaign continues in southern Lebanon, and violent attacks on Palestinians have now spread to Tyre. During the past week, several explosions occurred in refugee camps there and also in Sidon, causing the deaths of at least three Palestinian civilians. According to UN sources, anti-Palestinian leaflets signed by an extremist Christian militia group have been circulated for the first time in Tyre. | , | 25X1 |
| | Comment: The continuing violence and intimidation against Palestinians in the south underscore the hostility among many Lebanese—especially the Christians—to a permanent assimilation o Palestinians into their society. If Israel does not provide additional military protection around the camps, more widespread violence is likely. This would strengthen the PLO's refusal to withdraw its forces unless it were assured of adequate safeguards—possibly by an | | |
| | international force—to protect Palestinian civilians. | | 25X1 25X1 |
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| PHILIPPINES-US: Purchase of Helicopters | | |
| Manila has signed a \$60 million assured by | a LIS firm to | |
| ivianna nas sioneo a aba million contract with | pirit helicopters. The | |
| Manila has signed a \$63 million contract with purchase two UH-60A Black Hawk and 17 S-76 S | filting the contract of the co | |
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
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




OPEC Crude Oil Production







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
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Special Analysis

| INTERNATIONAL: Outlook for Oil Prices |
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| Recent gains in OPEC oil production and the firming of spot prices indicate a return to more stable conditions in the oil market. With the exception of Nigeria, OPEC members evidently are abiding by the production and pricing guidelines established in March. Even non-OPEC producers appear determined to avoid actions that could provoke a drop in prices. Nevertheless, OPEC will have difficulty in maintaining current prices over the near term without a sustained recovery in Free World oil consumption. |
| Spot prices for crude oil are near official prices. Arab Light crude oil prices are now only 15 cents below the official price, while spot prices for Nigerian Light crude oil are running about 30 cents above the official level. Most industry sources expect further price fluctuations in the coming weeks as the market attempts to sort out trends in supply and demand. |
| Oil sales in the major developed countries fell by about 5 percent during the first quarter of this year. This decline probably will continue, although at a slower pace, until the economies of these countries begin a sustained recovery. |
| Although the OECD economies appear to be pulling out of the recession, the recovery is neither uniform nor rapid. The level of economic growth in the US and Japan is likely to outpace that in Western Europe. |
| Inventories Drawn Down |
| Excess oil inventories and the expectation of an oil price decline have prompted a sizable inventory liquidation in recent months and have helped to keep demand for OPEC oil depressed. Non-Communist oil stocks fell to about 4.6 billion barrels by the end of March—still some 200 million barrels above normal levels. |
| During the current quarter, inventories probably will hold steady |
| or decline by roughly 1 million barrels per day, as compared with a normal seasonal increase of about 1.5 million barrels per day. By the fourth quarter, however, inventory depletion will be halted as stocks approach minimum levels and companies believe that the price decline has ended. The restoration of normal inventories later this year could raise demand for OPEC oil by up to 2 million barrels per day. |

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